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The Division of Vaccine-Preventable Disease Control and National Immunization
Program of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has prepared
a plan of action as a guide for key actions that will be taken if a poliovirus
outbreak occurs in the Republic of Korea. The history of poliomyelitis and
vaccination against poliovirus in the nation was reviewed and the routine
surveillance procedures that are currently in place were described. The prin-
ciples and specific actions for an effective response to a poliovirus outbreak
were prepared. The guidelines clearly outline the actions to be taken in case
of a polio outbreak. When a suspected case of poliovirus infection is reported,
an immediate epidemiological investigation is to be conducted. The response
to a poliovirus outbreak includes case isolation, management of potential
contacts and immunization. All stakeholders are to be made aware of what key
actions should be taken at each stage of the response to a poliovirus outbreak
in the nation.1. Introduction
1.1. History of poliomyelitis and vaccination
against poliovirus
The first case of poliomyelitis in Korea was reported
in 1939. The inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) and the oral
polio vaccine (OPV) were introduced in 1958 and 1962
respectively, and the National Immunization Programibuted under the terms o
y-nc/3.0) which permits unr
is properly cited.
ol and Prevention. Publishe(NIP), which was established in 1966, designated
poliomyelitis as a second-class communicable disease.
Until 1975 most vaccinations used both IPV and OPV,
thereafter only OPV was used.
The overall risk for vaccine-associated paralytic
poliomyelitis is estimated to be approximately one per
2.4 million doses of OPV vaccine [1]. One vaccine-asso-
ciated paralytic poliomyelitis case was reported in Koreaf the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
estricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
d by Elsevier. All rights reserved.
Table 1. Number of reported cases of poliomyelitis in Korea
Year 1960e65 1966e70 1971e75 1976e80 1981e83 1984e2010
Cases 6541 1088 337 137 9 0
66 K.M. Song, et alin 2003 [2]. In 2004, the Korea Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (KACIP) recommended the use
of an IPV-only schedule in the NIP, and since then only
IPV has been used in Korea.
Polio vaccination is recommended at 2, 4 and
6 months of age with a booster dose at 4e6 years. The
immunization rate for polio has been sustained at an
estimated level of 90e95% since the 1980s.
1.2. Reported cases of poliomyelitis in Korea
According to a study conducted during 1962e1964,
poliomyelitis cases were most prevalent in one-year-
olds, and 70% of the cases were in children below
3 years of age [3]. After polio vaccine was introduced in
the 1960s, the incidence of poliomyelitis declined to 0.1/
100,000 persons and the mortality rate decreased to
0.1e0.4% [4]. After the five reported cases in 1983, no
case of wild poliovirus infection has been reported in
Korea up to 2010 (Table 1) [5].
1.3. National infectious disease surveillance and
laboratory surveillance systems
All notifiable vaccine-preventable diseases (VPD) are
reported from public health centers, private clinics and
hospitals to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (KCDC) via a web-based system under the
Prevention of Communicable Disease Act. The system
is known as the Korea National Infectious Disease
Surveillance (NIDS) system.
NIDS is coupled with a laboratory surveillance
system. Apart from reporting VPD cases to NIDS, forFigure. National Infectious Disease Surveillance and laboratory
to the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC)
For confirmatory testing, samples taken from patients are sent d
indirectly through the Research Institute of Public Health and Envi
shared between the KCDC and the KNIH. VPD Z vaccine-prevenconfirmatory testing public health centers, private
clinics and hospitals can send various samples from
patients suspected of having infectious diseases directly
to the Korea National Institute of Health (KNIH) or
indirectly through a provincial Research Institute of
Public Health and Environment to the KNIH. The results
of these tests are reported to the KCDC. A schematic
flow chart of the NIDS and laboratory surveillance
systems is shown in the Figure.1.4. Surveillance of acute flaccid paralysis
An annual non-polio rate of acute flaccid paralysis
(AFP) of 1/100,000 in children under 15 years of age is
a requirement for certifying polio eradication in a country
[6]. Since 1998, AFP surveillance in Korea has been
conducted every year with 70 reporting hospitals under
the coordination of the KNIH [7]. As of 2011, 50 sentinel
hospitals, including all the pediatrician-training hospitals,
are under surveillance.1.5. Laboratory confirmation of poliomyelitis
Virologic evaluation to confirm poliomyelitis consists
of tests on two adequate stool specimens from each AFP
patient collected 24e48 hours apart and within 14 days
of onset of paralysis [8,9]. Laboratory confirmation of
poliomyelitis is performed using a cell culture/neutrali-
zation test. The stool is further tested using real time
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) using pan-enterovirus [9], group-specific [10] and
serotype-specific primer sets [11].surveillance systems Health facilities report notifiable diseases
through public health centers in provinces/metropolitan cities.
irectly to the Korea National Institute of Health (KNIH) or
ronment. The test results and information on reported cases are
table disease; NIP Z National Immunization Program.
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Outbreak
In 2010, in response to the increased possibility of
poliovirus importation because of a recent poliovirus
outbreak in the European region, the Division of VPD
Control and NIP of the KCDC prepared a response plan
as a guide for key actions to be taken if a poliovirus
outbreak occurs in the Republic of Korea.
2.1. Principles
￭ Because the Republic of Korea maintains a high
immunization rate and has generally good sanita-
tion, a poliomyelitis outbreak is unlikely to occur in
the country.
￭ However, a single detected case of poliovirus
infection would be considered as an outbreak and
would initiate activation of the response plan.
￭ All decisions on the response to poliovirus detec-
tion will be made at the national level.
￭ Regular, timely and comprehensive information
sharing with the public, relevant partners and
international society is important.
2.2. Action plan
Each action is not necessarily separate from other
actions; rather it is more likely that a number of actions
will take place simultaneously. Response teams will be
required at all levels of the public health system. The
primary response will be driven at the jurisdiction level
and coordination at the national level will be overseen
by the KCDC.
2.2.1. Reporting suspected case
Any poliovirus isolated from a reported AFP case or
any suspected poliovirus infection case reported through
the NIDS will signal the immediate initiation of the
actions described below.
2.2.2. Case investigation
Within 24 hours of a case being reported an epide-
miological investigation will be initiated and, for viro-
logic evaluation, stool specimens from every case will
be sent to the national polio laboratory for testing.
Epidemiological investigation will determine the likely
source of the infection and indicate if the virus might
have spread further. It will be essential to collect as
much information as possible about the patient’s history
including:
￭ Information about the patient, e.g. age and sex.
￭ Clinical course and laboratory testing.
￭ Immunization status of the patient.
￭ Exposure history (1): residence in or travel to
a polio endemic country or to a country that hasrecently reported transmission of poliovirus or
vaccine-derived poliovirus.
￭ Exposure history (2): contact with persons recently
immunized with OPV, or with persons who have
recently traveled to a polio endemic country or
contact with persons who have traveled to a country
that has recently reported importation of polio cases
or vaccine-derived poliovirus or that uses OPV.
For an example of the Suspected polio case work-
sheet see Table 2.
2.2.3. Expert meetings
When the case investigation is complete, the KCDC
will convene an urgent meeting of the KACIP sub-
committee for DTaP/polio vaccines to inform the
advisory group of a possible polio outbreak. The sub-
committee will review the results of the case investi-
gation and check that all the necessary information has
been obtained. The sub-committee will then decide what
further information should be obtained and provide
technical advice on what actions should be taken in
response to the outbreak. When appropriate, the results
of the meeting will be presented to KACIP members.
Because a polio outbreak is a public health emer-
gency of international concern under the International
Health Regulations (IHR), the IHR Focal Point of Korea
will immediately notify the World Health Organization
of the situation.
2.2.4. Outbreak response
The poliovirus outbreak response includes:
￭ Case isolation
￭ Management of potential contacts
￭ Immunization
￭ Cleaning and disinfecting
￭ Enhanced surveillance
￭ Risk communication
2.2.4.1. Case isolation
Individuals identified as or suspected of being infected
with poliovirus will be isolated to reduce the risk of virus
spread. The patient will be isolated from other patients in
hospitals. Weekly stool specimens will be collected from
the patient and tested in the national polio laboratory.
Isolation can be terminated when two consecutive weekly
stool samples are negative for poliovirus.
Since poliovirus transmission is mainly person-to-
person via the fecal-oral route, health care workers or
other caregivers should follow contact precautions.
2.2.4.2. Management of potential contacts
To contain the spread of the virus, the relevant juris-
diction under the supervision of the higher-level organi-
zation will identify potential contacts of a patient and
undertake appropriate measures. Potential contacts would
Table 2. Suspected polio case worksheet
68 K.M. Song, et albe: 1) household contacts who lived with the patient and
shared a toilet during the infectious period; 2) health care
workers who cared for the patient during the infectious
period; and 3) public contacts including toilet contacts
who contacted or shared a toilet with the patient before
the patient was isolated and the toilet was cleaned.
￭ Household contacts have the greatest risk of being
exposed to poliovirus and should be isolated at
home until it is proved that they are not infected.
Stool specimens should be taken at least 3 daysafter first exposure to the index patient. Contacts
can be released from quarantine when two stool
samples taken 24e48 hours apart are negative for
poliovirus.
￭ For health care workers who have been in close
contact with the index patient and who have no
recorded immunization history, or who are not yet
completely vaccinated, two stool samples should
be taken 24e48 hours apart, the first being taken
at least 3 days after first exposure to the index
patient.
Table 3. Contact tracing worksheet
A plan for response to poliovirus importation 69￭ Public contacts will be provided with information
on poliovirus infection, hygiene and vaccination.
They will be informed that they might have been in
contact with poliovirus and advised that they should
immediately consult a public health center if they
develop any symptom that could be attributed to
poliovirus infection.For an example of the Contact tracing worksheet see
Table 3.
2.2.4.3. Immunization
IPV is the only polio vaccine available in Korea,
and so IPV will be used in response to an outbreak. All
index patient contacts should check their immunization
Table 4. Sample notification letter to the public and
potential contacts
This letter is to notify you that a suspected/confirmed case
of poliomyelitis is reported at OOO region and that you
or your child may have been exposed.
Poliomyelitis, known as polio, is a highly infectious disease
caused by a virus named poliovirus that invades the
nervous system. The disease usually affects children.
Approximately 95% of persons infected with polio will
have no symptoms and 4e8% of infected persons have
minor symptoms, such as fever, fatigue, and flu-like
symptoms. Less than 1% of polio infections result in
permanent paralysis of the limbs. Of those paralyzed, 5
e10% die when the respiratory muscles are affected.
Polio is spread by person-to-person contact. After the report
of five cases in 1983 and until recently, because of
improved hygiene and vigorous immunization, no wild
poliovirus infection has been reported in Korea.
However, a suspected/confirmed case of poliomyelitis
was reported at (where) on (when).
We strongly urge you to check your child’s polio
immunization record. In Korea, polio vaccination is
recommended at 2, 4 and 6 months of age, with a booster
dose at 4e6 years. All children and adolescents should be
immunized with polio vaccine according to their age. If
you have any questions regarding immunization, please
contact OOO public health center at OOO-OOO-OOOO.
If you or your child develops any of the polio-like
symptoms described above, you and your child should
avoid further contact and immediately notify OOO public
health center(Tel: OOO-OOO-OOOO).
We are closely working with the Korea Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention to respond quickly and
effectively to this possible polio outbreak. We will notify
you if any other information becomes available. Thank
you for your cooperation.
Department of Health
OOO Metropolitan city/Province
70 K.M. Song, et alrecords and update immunization as recommended.
Among the contacts, all children and adolescents
should be immunized with IPV according to their age.
If the vaccination status of a contact is unknown
or incomplete, they will be offered a primary series
of IPV.
Because there is no concrete evidence on the post-
prophylaxis effect of the poliovirus vaccine, all those
vaccinated will be informed that they are not necessarily
protected and that they should still consult a public
health center if they develop any symptom.
2.2.4.4. Cleaning and disinfection
Proper cleaning and disinfecting of areas used by an
infected individual is required to prevent onward
transmission. Cleaning and disinfecting of every object
that might harbor infectious material, including toilets
used by the patient during the infectious period, should
be diligently carried out. During the isolation of the
patient, the stool should be managed properly until it
tests negative for poliovirus.
2.2.4.5. Enhanced surveillance
If a poliovirus outbreak is identified, all virology
laboratories in the jurisdiction will be alerted. All
clinicians will be immediately informed through various
channels, including but not limited to letters or fax, that
they are required to participate in the intensified
surveillance for AFP. All clinicians should actively
encourage children and adolescents to keep up their
immunization. Enhanced surveillance should be main-
tained for a period of at least 6 months after the last case
is detected.
2.2.4.6. Risk communication
Risk communication would include establishing
public confidence, providing clear information and
rapid and up-to-date announcements to the public.
Gaining public confidence is necessary to avoid social
disorder and to encourage desirable behaviors, such as
immunization and the reporting of any suspicious
case.
For a sample notification letter see Table 4.
2.2.5. Lessons learned and revision of the plan
At least six months after the last case of poliovirus
infection, documentation of the interruption of trans-
mission of poliovirus will be prepared. Detailed and
comprehensive documentation describing the epidemi-
ological background, the findings of the case investi-
gations laboratory results, the response to immunization
and the results of enhanced surveillance is required.
While this documentation is being prepared, all
activities in response to the poliovirus outbreak will be
reviewed and the reasons why the poliovirus outbreak
occurred in the first place will be investigated. All
lessons learned will be reflected in a revised nationalaction plan and in improvements in the existing AFP
surveillance system.
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